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Sweat v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 76 (October 5, 2017)1 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE 
 
Summary  
 
 The Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect a defendant from prosecution of any original 
charges when the defendant accepts a plea agreement for a lesser-included offense and then fails 
to comply with all the terms of the agreement. The Court ultimately determined that a defendant 
waives his double jeopardy rights when he pleads guilty and fails to comply with the remaining 
terms of the agreement. 
 
Background 
 
 On May 9, 2016, the State of Nevada charged Lonnie Sweat with battery constituting 
domestic violence—a category C felony. After negotiating a plea agreement with the State to drop 
the charge of battery constituting domestic violence, Sweat accepted a plea agreement. Sweat 
agreed to plead guilty in justice court to a misdemeanor, and plead guilty in district court to a 
felony.  
 Sweat pleaded guilty in justice court; in district court, however, he refused to plead guilty. 
So, the State filed an amended information, which reinstated the battery the original felony battery 
charge. Sweat filed a motion to dismiss—that the district court denied—holding that “plea 
agreements are subject to contract principles and that Sweat violated the spirit of negotiations by 
reneging on the plea agreement.”  
 Sweat, then, petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition, claiming that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause protects him from prosecution for the felony offense in district court. 
But the Court disagreed.  
 
Discussion 
 
Sweat’s petition should be entertained 
 
 The Court exercised its discretion in granting Sweat’s writ of prohibition because Sweat’s 
petition raised an important issue of law. The important issue of law that needed clarification was 
“whether a defendant's conviction on a lesser misdemeanor offense in the justice court, as part of 
a plea agreement with the State, precludes prosecution on a greater felony offense where the 
defendant has withdrawn from the plea agreement with the State.” Therefore, the Court entertained 
Sweat’s petition. 
 
The misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence conviction is a lesser-included offense of 
the felony domestic violence charge. 
 
 The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against three abuses: (1) a second prosecution for 
the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, 
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and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.”2 A second prosecution for the same offense, 
at issue here, occurs when the elements of one offense are entirely integrated within the elements 
of the second offense.3 The Court found that the misdemeanor battery constituting domestic 
violence conviction constitutes a lesser included offense of the felony domestic violence charge 
and thus “the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a prosecution for both offenses.”4 
 
Sweat waived his double jeopardy claim by accepting a plea agreement and subsequently failing 
to comply with his obligations under the agreement. 
 
 Although the Court found that the misdemeanor offense Sweat pleaded guilty to is a lesser-
included offense of the felony charge, the Court held that by Sweat pleading guilty and 
subsequently failing to comply with the terms of the agreement, the Double Jeopardy Clause did 
not prohibit the State from prosecuting Sweat for the felony.  
The United States Supreme Court held in Ricketts v. Adamson that even though a plea 
agreement may not explicitly mention the double jeopardy clause or waiver of the double jeopardy 
rights under the clause, “the Double Jeopardy Clause does not relieve a defendant from the 
consequences of his voluntary choice [to breach the agreement].”5 Under the plea agreement, 
Sweat agreed to plead guilty (1) in justice court to a misdemeanor; and (2) in district court to a 
felony.  But Sweat failed at (2) when he refused to plead guilty to a felony in district court. Thus, 
relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Ricketts, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that 
Sweat waived his double jeopardy rights when he failed to comply with (2).  
 
Conclusion 
 
 A defendant, who voluntarily fails to comply with the terms of a plea agreement, waives 
his double jeopardy right to be prosecuted of the original offense.  
                                                
2 Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 604, 291 P.3d 1274, 1278; see generally U.S. CONST. amend. V; 
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
3 See Estes v. State, 122 Nev. 1123, 1143, 146 P.3d 1114, 1127 (2006) (“To determine the existence 
of a lesser-included offense, this court looks to whether the offense in question cannot be 
committed without committing the lesser offense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Barton v. State, 117 Nev. 686, 692, 30 P.3d 1103, 1107 (2001), overruled on other grounds by 
Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 147 P.3d 1101 (2006). 
4 United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Estes, 122 Nev. at 1143, 146 P.3d at 1127. 
5 Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
See also Dutton v. State, 970 P.2d 925, 932, 935 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (noting that a defendant 
may relinquish his double jeopardy rights by his conduct even though the waiver was not 
explicitly outlined in the plea agreement); State v. De Nistor, 694 P.2d 237, 242 (Ariz. 1985) 
(stating that a defendant waives a double jeopardy defense if after the court accepts the guilty 
plea the defendant moves to withdraw his plea, and the withdrawal is granted).  
